Nebraska Supreme Court declines to reduce father's child support obligation for social security benefits one of his disabled children receives. Gress v. Gress, S-06-607, 274 Neb. 686. One of the father's children had downs syndrome and received $564 per month social security benefits. the decision does not specify whether the social security took the form of SSI or SSDI. The father argued that in accordance with Ward v. Ward, 7 N eb. A pp. 821, 585 N .W.2d 551 (1998) he should receive a credit for some of the social security support. The Nebraska Supreme Court declines to overrule Ward, distinguishing the situation where a disabled child has additional needs that government benefits support from one where the child is otherwise normal but receives the benefits because of the death of the parent. "it not appropriate to offset child support costs where, as here, the Social Security benefits are intended to mitigate the additional costs that accompany disabilities." The Supreme Court might have discussed whether it would distinguish between Title II disability benefits, for example benefits to children of deceased or disabled workers and Title XVI benefits which are benefits to disabled children that parents' payroll contributions do not fund.

Nebraska Supreme Court finds personal jurisdiction proper for child's action against divorced parent who travelled to Nebraska and had his relatives do the same to take her to Canada where the parent allegedly abused the child. S.L. v. Steven L., S-06-563, 274 Neb. 646 The Lancaster County District Court dismissed the ex-wife's tort action against divorced father for allegedly abusing their child while she visited the father in Canada stating the court could not assert personal jurisdiction over the father. Nebraska Supreme Court reverses, finding for intentional injuries the pleading and other materials showed the defendants contacts to this State were sufficiently connected to Nebraska to justify personal jurisdiction over him. "one who removes a minor child from her Nebraska home under the guise of exercising a visitation right in another jurisdiction, and then intentionally subjects the child to harm before returning her to this state, could reasonably expect to be haled into a Nebraska court to answer for such conduct in a civil action brought on behalf of the child." Finally jurisdiction was appropriate in Nebraska as hearing the case here did not offend fair play and substantial justice. "Nebraska’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Steven in this action would not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Nebraska Supreme Court refuses to give custody to mother from Columbia who barely spoke English, felt helpless and thought social services authorities owed her something for it. Maska v. Maska, S-07-187, 274 Neb. 629 Aurora Ramirez Maska, a native of Columbia, sought custody of her two children in divorce proceedings in Buffalo County District Court. The district court awarded custody of the children to the American father during the school year with summer custody to the mother. On top of that the Court ordered the husband to pay Aurora $78 per month child support along with 46% of the kids' social security benefits, presumably from the father's disability claim. Nebraska Supreme Court affirms over Aurora's objection that the district court ruled against her because she was from Columbia, could barely speak English and felt that American welfare owed her something. Looks like a slam dunk to me that you would want 7 and 5 year old children to live with a parent who spoke English, at least during the school year. Sadly Justice Wright had to remind the parties that the Supreme Court was not ruling against her because of her nationality, rather it was in the best interests of the children to live with the American parent during the school year. Aurora’s final argument is that the district court abused its discretion by using her national origin and language as a factor against her when evaluating the best interests of the children. Her argument has no merit. The court’s decree does not state that it used Aurora’s national origin or language as a factor. (The child psychologist) recommended to the court that the primary physical custody of the children be given to Joel during the school year and to Aurora during the summer months. That is the recommendation the court adopted, and we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision.

Finally a win for the dad: Nebraska Supreme Court (CJ Heavican) reverses Lincoln County District Judge Murphy's order for joint custody when neither party requested joint custody. Supreme Court finds parties have a due process right to have notice of potential rulings from the court. Zahl v. Zahl, S-06-1123Somehow the supreme court reversed the Learned Hand of the Plains, District Judge John Murphy. The parents disputed custody of their one child, born June 2004. They were married in July 2004. Father worked for Union Pacific running trains to Marysville Kansas. Mother worked for the sheriff's department. The parties separated only several months after the child was born, and mother had a child a few years older from a prior marriage, and at the time mother was in court disputing custody of that child. The court finally ordered joint custody but neither party had requested it, and at a schedule that apparently did not fit the father's railroad schedule well. Father appeals. Supreme Court reverses. When ordering joint custody under Nebraska statute § 42-364(5) (Cum. supp. 2006), a district court must specifically find that joint custody is in a child’s best interests. the district court failed to make that finding in the dissolution decree. Further, because neither party had requested joint physical custody, the evidence presented at trial was limited to which parent should have sole custody. We conclude that under this circumstance, the court must conduct a separate hearing on joint physical custody before ordering such, and that its order must specifically find that joint physical custody is in the child’s best interests. "A trial court’s authority under § 42-364(5) to order joint physical custody when the parties have not requested it must be exercised in a manner consistent with due process requirements...fundamental fairness requires that...when a trial court determines at a general custody hearing that joint physical custody is, or may be, in a child’s best interests, but neither party has requested this custody arrangement, the court must give the parties an opportunity to present evidence on the issue before imposing joint custody"

When is a good nephew a better son? Thomas Malloy died in Holt county in 2003 owning nearly 1300 acres of farm ground. He gave through his will over 300 acres to his nephew Thomas Welsh with an option to purchase 640 more. Tom Welsh's father died when the nephew was very young and he considered Tom Malloy a father figure. The Holt County Court however refused to allow Welsh a lower inheritance tax as a child under 77-2004. The court of appeals (J Sievers) agrees finding that the county court was not clearly wrong to determine while the deceased and the nephew were close they did not have a parent child relationship. In re Estate of Malloy, A-06-178, 15 Neb. App. 755"Applying in re Estate of Ackerman,250 Neb. 665, 550 N.W.2d 678 (1996), to the instant case, we conclude, for the reasons that follow, that the county court did not err in denying Welsh the status he seeks under § 77-2004. We note that our review is for error appearing on the record, considering all of the circumstances of a particular case, and we do not disturb the lower court’s factual findings unless they are clearly wrong."

Grandpa put bond money for the defendant's child abuse case, which started at $150000 but ended up at $10% of $50000. The defendant assigned the bond proceeds to grandpa. The county attorney also sought to garnish the bond fund for past due child support. The Lancaster County District Court denied the county attorney's request to intercept the bond money and ordered it paid to grandfather and the County Attorney appealed. Nebraska Supreme Court dismisses appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding the State was not authorized to appeal this garnishment type action from a criminal case. State v. Merrill, S-06-081 We do not find such statutes (garnishment provisions of §25-1301 [(Cum. supp. 2006)] and §25-1911] authorize the (county attorney's) appeal in this case. the state’s remedy is in the civil case. regardless of the status of that civil proceeding, the state has no specific statutory authorization to appeal the December 15, 2005, order entered in this criminal case directing the clerk to return the posted bond money to Andersen.

Jennifer Brown hits the NFL lottery: even though she by her own admission had sex with two other men near the time she conceived a child with former Husker player Correl Buckhalter, Nebraska supreme court affirms default judgment against Buckhalter. State on behalf of A.E. v. Buckhalter, S-06-693, 273 Neb. 443The Nebraska Supreme Court took Jennifer Brown at her word that she had sex with three men including Buckhalter near the time they conceived AE. You know the other two were not the fathers, and Buckhalters “private” test was not reliable. So if you are a something headed “ho” admitting to having sex with three men at the same time means there werent more?

Nebraska Supreme Court allows father whom a court had earlier determined him to be the child's father to dispute exgirlfriend's adoption, cant decide whether its a case of statutory interpretation or constitutional lawIn re Adoption of Jaden M., 272 Neb. 789 Filed December 22, 2006. Earlier a court found the defedant to be the child's father and ordered support, which the defendant mostly paid. The mother/exgirlfriend then married and her new husband sought to adopt the child. MOther contended that since the father failed to register with father's registry and he appeared to not meet any other standard in 43-104.22 that require father's consent. Nebraska Supreme Court finds for the father's rights, finding that an adjudicated father is neither a claimed father(§ 43-104.02) or a "claimant-father" (§ 43-104.05.)But then even if Nebraska statute 43-104.22 somehow did exclude the defendant, it is unconstitutional to exclude an adjudicated father from those entitled to consent before adoption. We, however, conclude that § 43-104.22(7) does not apply to a father who has been adjudicated the child's father in a paternity action. Applying § 43-104.22(7) infringes upon Brian's constitutionally protected parental rights. Because he has provided support and established familial ties with his biological child, his interest in personal contact with his child has acquired substantial protection. In re Application of S.R.S. and M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d 272 (1987). His rights must therefore be determined under the considerations delineated in § 43-104.22, apart from subsection (7). As in White v. Mertens, 225 Neb. 241, 404 N.W.2d 410 (1987), Tracey and Ronald's argument fails because Brian is not "a person claiming to be the father of the child" under § 43-104.02 or a "claimant-father" under § 43-104.05--he is Jaden's biological father. The court erred in applying the registry statutes to circumvent the need for Brian's consent.

In another Eihusen dissolution of marriage action, the Nebraska supreme Court denies ex wife's request for a jury trial on her action to set aside dissolution settlement agreementRobert G. Eihusen, appellee, v. Linda K. Eihusen, appellant. Eihusen v. Eihusen, 272 Neb. 462 Filed October 27, 2006. No. S-05-523. Wife of Chief Industries Robert Eihusen agreed to sign a divorce settlement agreement before consulting an attorney. Then she complained that her exhusband robert had undervalued the debenture Chief owed to him by $3.5 million dollars. She claimed the debentures option price of $100 per share should equal the parties ESOPS which allowed option exercising at $167. Supreme Court denies her request for jury trial. And affirms District Court judgment against her. Apples dont fall far from the tree so Mrs. Eihusen could have taken some cues from Virgils maneuvering. The existence of the statutory right to vacate a judgment can be traced to 1867, prior to the adoption of the Nebraska Constitution. See Rev. Stat. § 602 (1867). The statutory provision as it read then is substantially similar to the version now in effect. Since 1867, that provision, as now codified at § 25-2001, has bestowed upon a district court the power to vacate or modify its own judgment for one of nine enumerated reasons, including fraud. Since its enactment, the nature of this action has been equitable. As we described it in In re Estate of West, 226 Neb. 813, 833, 415 N.W.2d 769, 783 (1987), an action under § 25-2001 is "equitable in character, available or administered on equitable principles, and extended on equitable terms." Moreover, the relief provided by this statute--the vacation or modification of a judgment--is not legal in nature, but, rather, is equitable. See, e.g., In re Estate of West, supra. We conclude, therefore, that an action to set aside a judgment or order under § 25-2001 invokes the equitable powers of the court, for which there exists no constitutional right to a jury trial. Similarly, the evidence here reveals that during the settlement negotiations and throughout the subsequent divorce proceeding, Linda was aware of the existence of the debenture. Prior to signing the settlement agreement, Linda sought the advice of an accountant who, in turn, advised her to seek legal advice before signing the agreement. Linda elected not to do so.