Red Lake Indian Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction on highway within reservation boundaries, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rules in affirming defendant's summary judgment from the US District Court for Minnesota. Falmouth Institute American Indian Law Blog. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the Red Lake Nation court did not have the authority to hear a case involving a car accident on the reservation in which a non-member was involved. In Nord v. Kelly (No. 07-1564) the court affirmed a district court decision that the tribe did not have jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit brought by a tribal member against a non-member, non-Indian, for damages sustained in accident that took place on a state highway within the reservation. The tribal court took over four years to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss the tribal court lawsuit against him for a car accident. Then he filed a declaratory judgment action in Federal Court , District of Minnesota to declare no jurisdiction for the case. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirms summary judgment for the defendant who had filed the declaratory complaint. "Consistent with the reasoning of Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997) (holding "tribal courts may not entertain claims against nonmembers arising out of accidents on state highways, absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers on the highway in question"), we give effect to the plain language of the right-of-way granting instruments. There is no indication in the public records that the Red Lake Band retained any "gatekeeping right" over the public highway, no assertion that the right-of-way is no longer maintained as part of the State's highway, and no assertion that any statute or treaty grants or retains tribal authority over nonmembers in this situation. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 456. Therefore, the Red Lake Band has no "right of absolute and exclusive use and occupation" of that land, id. (internal marks omitted), and the public highway at issue, as in Strate, is the equivalent of alienated, non-Indian land for purposes of regulating the activities of nonmembers.

No Daubert gate keeping required when expert relies on scientific manual that the defendant did not dispute. Nebraska Court of Appeals with Judge Sievers dissenting affirms four judgments totalling over $3.5 million from automobile collisions occurring at the intersection of Highway 30 and Newberry Road in Lincoln County. While the State Department of Roads placed stop signs on both sides of the intersection, one flagged, posted a stop ahead sign and an additional sign that the intersection highway was ahead, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Lincoln County District Court the state negligently placed the right side stop sign too far away from the intersection because the sign was out of drivers' cone of vision. The Court of Appeals upholds allowing plaintiffs' expert witnesses to testify that the Department of Roads failed to comply with the State's Traffic Manual because the State failed to object to its own manual. That according to the Court of Appeals majority removed the experts' testifying about the manual from the Court's Daubert gate keeping function. Kirkwood v. State, A-05-1226, A-06-630 , 16 Neb. App. 459The Department of Roads does not challenge (plaintiff’s expert's) qualifications as an expert. The State also does not challenge the scientific validity and reliability of the Manual, upon which expert based his opinions. Rather, the State’s point of contention centers on expert’s interpretation of provisions of the Manual. For that reason, we conclude that no Daubert analysis was necessary. See, e.g., Perry Lumber Co. v. Durable Servs., 271 Neb. 303, 710 N .W.2d 854 (2006) (concluding that no Daubert analysis of methodology was necessary where party asserting error did not challenge scientific validity and reliability of methodology set forth in publication providing guidelines for scientific method of fire investigation). Dissenting Judge Sievers would reverse and dismiss all claims because the drivers' negligence in running the stop signs intervened as causes of the collisions. "Even if the State was negligent in its signing of the intersection, such was not a proximate cause, and that even if it could be considered a proximate cause, (the negligence of the drivers who failed to stop at the sign) combined with the comparative in one of the cases of the (plaintiff who turned in front of one of the drivers who failed to stop) constitute efficient intervening causes."