Nebraska Supreme Court reverses Court of Appeals decision that gave father of a child who was in his wife's words a "trick's baby" a second chance to keep parental rights. African-American Husband and his white wife were separated when wife gave birth to a baby who was white, blue eyed and had red hair. Husband was living in Kentucky and wife was in California when she gave birth. Wife was a drug addict and prostitute, so Husband had his suspicions. Nebraska Supreme Court upholds Douglas County Juvenile Court ruling however terminating black father's parental rights based on abandonment. In re Interest of Chance J., S-08-962, 279 Neb. 81 (12-31-2009) reversing In re Interest of Chance J.17 Neb. App. 645 - Neb: Court of Appeals, 2009 - Google Scholar. "Based on our de novo review of the record, that Andrew has intentionally withheld from Chance, without just cause or excuse, his presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, and opportunity for the display of parental affection. Furthermore, the physical appearance of a child or suspicions of infidelity are not just cause or excuse for abandoning a child born into wedlock. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Andrew did not abandon Chance. Because we have concluded that Andrew abandoned Chance within the meaning of § 43-292(1), we need not address Andrew’s conduct under § 43-292(9).Reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify a family are required when the State seeks to terminate parental rights under § 43-292(6). But in IN INTEREST OF HOPE278 Neb. 869 - Neb: Supreme Court, 2009 - Google Scholar L. et al., we recently reaffirmed our holding that reasonable efforts to reunify the family are required under the juvenile code only when termination is sought under § 43-292(6), not when termination is based on other grounds. Here, termination was not sought under § 43-292(6); it was sought under § 43-292(1), (2), and (9), and we have affirmed the court’s finding of abandonment under § 43-292(1). Therefore, after a proper finding of abandonment, it was not necessary for the State to make reasonable efforts to reunify this father and child."

Nebraska Supreme Court upholds juvenile's confession to a shooting homicide and declines to modify the "totality of circumstances" test for special considerations for juveniles, as the American Bar Association has recommended; also the police officers' characterization of the shooting as an accident did not mislead the defendant into thinking he was confessing to a negligent homicide. State v. Goodwin, S-08-1159, 278 Neb. 945 "While the minority of an accused is a factor to consider in determining the voluntariness of a confession, it is not determinative. Because the age, education, and intelligence of an accused are included within the totality of circumstances (test) of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights prior to a custodial interrogation, a court necessarily exercises "special caution" with respect to juveniles. Accordingly, we decline to modify the totality of the circumstances test for determining the voluntariness of Miranda waivers by minors we conclude that no implied promise of leniency can reasonably be inferred from the questioning techniques utilized by the detectives. There was no suggestion of any definite benefit which Goodwin could expect to receive in exchange for his statement. The references to lack of intent and a "tragic accident" were made in the context of the detectives’ efforts to persuade Goodwin to truthfully explain his involvement in the shooting. "

Nebraska Court of Appeals refuses to find 18 day delay for a juvenile detention hearing unreasonable, Through the eyes of a child initiative. In re Interest of April E. et al. Filed on May 27, 2008 Memorandum opinion, not designated for permanent publication A-08-036 through A-08-038SUMMARY: An 18-day delay between the ex parte order and the detention hearing is “on the outer edge of reasonableness” but is not unreasonable. The evidentiary basis of an ex parte temporary detention order is not appealable because the ex parte order is not a final order.

Saunders County murder case from 1977 could end up in juvenile court. Journalstar.com. "A 48-year-old man charged in a 30-year-old murder could see his case transferred to juvenile court.Jeffrey D. Glazebrook was 17 when May McReynolds, a 97-year-old retired school teacher, was raped on Nov. 6, 1977. She died two weeks later as a result of injuries suffered during her attack. Glazebrook, an inmate at the Tecumseh State Correctional Institution, was charged in conjunction with the crime in March, after a cold case investigator found that DNA from hairs found on McReynolds’ night clothes matched Glazebrook’s DNA. Glazebrook appeared in Saunders County District Court on Friday morning, where he was expected to enter a plea to first-degree murder and first-degree sexual assault charges. Instead, said Tom Klein, Glazebrook’s attorney, Judge Mary Gilbride advised Glazebrook that he may be able to have his case transferred to juvenile court. After Friday’s hearing, Klein said he was not yet sure if he would ask to have Glazebrook’s case transferred. “I had not had the opportunity to discuss that with him,” Klein said. There is no statute of limitations on transferring a first-degree murder charge to juvenile court, Saunders County Attorney Scott Tingelhoff said. Even so, it’s rare to transfer a case from to juvenile court so many years after the crime. “It’s a unique situation,” he said. Glazebrook is currently serving a sentence of 16 1/2 years to 38 years for the 1991 rape of a 45-year-old Lincoln woman. His projected release date is in July 2010. He is next scheduled to appear in Saunders County District Court 8:30 a.m. May 30. Klein said he expected Glazebrook would either enter a plea or a request to have the case transferred to juvenile court during that hearing.

Juvenile courts may not consider the willingness of prospective parents to adopt the children of parents against whom the State seeks to terminate parental rights (Section 43-292.02). However the court's considering the adoptive parents' willingness to adopt and other testimony was harmless error and did not impair the terminated parent's due process. In re Interest of Destiny A. et al., S-06-1380, 274 Neb. 713

Last week's Nebraska Supreme Court decision In re Interest of Kevin K., S-06-447, 274 Neb. 678 might shed some light on Gary Lacey's crying need for more attorney help in the Lancaster County Attorney's office. The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over the child because he was a truant (§ 43-247(3)(b)), something the Supreme Court calls a "status crime" (§ 43-245(15) (Reissue 2004)). After the child reached 16 his mother released him from attending public school. See 79-201. The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction. The State DHHS agreed with the juvenile judge's decision to close the case. The Lancaster County Attorney did the appealing. No wonder you are short handed Gary, you are trying to keep cases in the system that should be closed. The Supreme Court, J. Stephan affirms closing the case.where a juvenile is adjudicated solely on the basis of habitual truancy from school pursuant to § 43-247(3)(b), and the status of truancy is subsequently terminated by the lawful execution of a parental release authorizing discontinuation of school enrollment pursuant to § 79-201(3)(d), a juvenile court may terminate its jurisdiction without a finding that such termination is in the best interests of the juvenile.

Although the Nebraska Supreme Court earlier held that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2281 (how to assess criminal restitution, see In re Interest of Brandon M., 273 Neb. 47, 727 N.W.2d 230 (2007) did not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings, the Supreme Court holds that juvenile courts should use its rules for "guidance." In re Interest of Laurance S., S-06-1439, S-06-1443 , 274 Neb. 620 Nebraska Supreme Court (J. Miller-Lerman) reverses $29,000 restitution orders against two Fremont brothers who vandalized a school. Can you say "legislating from the bench?" Justice Miller-Lerman cant stand that juvenile courts don't have statutory guidelines on assessing restitution, so she helps them come up with some. $29000 was just too high a price to charge two likely career losers without considering their ability to pay. Did it occur to the supreme court that putting a little shock value into their heads might wake them up? Instead typical of her blame the victim attitude she is more concerned with the self-esteem of the delinquents. "The result of such [an order] would not be rehabilitation. Rather, it would give the [juvenile] a sense of unfairness, injustice and bitterness towards the system because the chance to reform would not be present.’”

State of Nebraska claims immunity from suit against it for overall mismanagement of foster care system Omaha.com The State of Nebraska has answered claims that it harms the children in its foster care system by saying the state is protected against such lawsuits. Attorneys for the state asked the U.S. District Court on Thursday to dismiss a lawsuit filed in September that is seeking an overhaul of Nebraska's child welfare system. Milo Mumgaard, one of the attorneys who brought the lawsuit, called the state's response "not unexpected." He said other states have used many of the same defense in response to similar child welfare lawsuits. Such legal defenses mean the two sides will spend time and money disputing legal issues, rather than getting to the merits of the case or talking about possible settlements, he said. "It doesn't have to be that way," Mumgaard said. "We hope we can start negotiating sooner rather than later." Mumgaard is executive director of the Nebraska Appleseed Center for Law in the Public Interest, which filed the lawsuit jointly with Children's Rights, a child welfare group based in New York City (Things are bad; This advocacy organization had 16 suits pending against jurisdictions across the country). New York advocacy organization has its complaint here, pdf. Five foster children were named as plaintiffs in the Nebraska suit. Gov. Dave Heineman and five top officials of the Nebraska Health and Human Services System are named as defendants. The suit alleges that Nebraska deprives foster children of the chance for a safe, stable childhood. It also claims the state fails to protect foster children and provide them with basic care and services. In its response, the state denies virtually all of the claims made in the lawsuit. The state argues that the plaintiffs lack standing, the court lacks jurisdiction and the case cannot be pursued as a class action. It also argues that the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions protect the state from the kinds of claims made in the suit. 2 years ago the State lost an 11th amendment defense to a suit against it claiming the foster care administrators discriminated against a child who was HIV positive. Doe et al v State of Nebraska, 8th Circuit 02-2014NE The response was filed on behalf of the state by attorneys from the Lincoln law firm of Harding Schultz and Downs. Attorney General Jon Bruning declined to comment on Thursday's filing, according to his spokeswoman, Regan Anson. A Health and Human Services spokeswoman has declined to comment on pending litigation. However, she said the state has made progress in many areas of an improvement program in which the goals are safety, permanence and well-being for children. Nebraska's child welfare system has been under intense scrutiny since reports of nearly 30 children dying from abuse and neglect prompted then-Gov. Mike Johanns to convene a special task force in 2003.