Neb. Appellate sidesteps claim that common law Rule Against Perpetuities survives despite superseding legislation; Court rules that real estate purchaser would lose out to third party who properly exercised right of first refusal over property; Court further finds that owner of property who did not answer complaint of intervening first refusal holder could not assert that first refusal holder had improperly exercised that right Greenhall Investments v. Wiese Dev. Corp., 14 Neb.App. 155 Filed November 8, 2005. No. A-04-279. Greenhall and Wiese entered into a purchase agreement whereby Greenhall sought to purchase real property from Wiese. Wiese's ability to sell the property was subject to a right of first refusal requiring Wiese to give Clatterbuck the opportunity to match any offer to purchase the property. Clatterbuck purported to exercise the right of first refusal and entered into a purchase agreement with Wiese. Litigation ensued in which Greenhall sought an order compelling Wiese to specifically perform under the purchase agreement between Greenhall and Wiese. Clatterbuck intervened and sought an order compelling Wiese to specifically perform under the purchase agreement between Wiese and Clatterbuck. The district court for Douglas County granted partial summary judgment in favor of Wiese and dismissed Greenhall's claim for specific performance. Additionally, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Clatterbuck and ordered Wiese to specifically perform under the purchase agreement between Wiese and ClatterbuckWe find that the right of first refusal was limited in duration by the contract in which it was contained and that accordingly, it did not violate any rule against perpetuities which might apply to it. We also find that Clatterbuck timely exercised the right of first refusal. As such, we affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of Wiese and against Greenhall. Further, we find that inasmuch as Wiese had urged the district court to find a sufficient exercise of Clatterbuck's right of first refusal, Wiese is precluded from challenging the adequacy of that exercise on appeal.... Court finds no need to address whether a common law Rule Against Perpetuities survived legislative enactment of Nebraska Uniform Rule Against Perpetuities Act Greenhall asserts that the right of first refusal in the forbearance agreement between Wiese and Clatterbuck violates the common-law rule against perpetuities. Section 76-2008 provides, "The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act supersedes the rule of common law known as the rule against perpetuities." Greenhall argues that this provision means the statutory rule supersedes the common-law rule only with respect to those interests actually covered by the statutory rule and that because the right of first refusal at issue in this case is excluded from the coverage of the statutory rule, the common-law rule's application to the right is not superseded. Wiese argues that this provision means that the statutory rule supersedes the common-law rule entirely and that the common-law rule was, in effect, abolished. We decline to address the question of whether the common-law rule against perpetuities is superseded only with respect to interests actually covered by the statutory rule against perpetuities or with respect to all interests. As noted above, we conclude that the right of first refusal in this case, as a matter of law, would not be violative of the common-law rule against perpetuities, even assuming that the common-law rule is applicable. The common-law rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation of future interests or estates which, by possibility, may not become vested within a life or lives in being and 21 years, together with the period of gestation when necessary to cover cases of posthumous birth. See In re Trust Estate of Darling, 219 Neb. 705, 365 N.W.2d 821 (1985). The right of first refusal in the present case was limited in duration to a period of time well within this perpetuities period. ... Property owner estopped from asserting the first refusal holder did not properly assert his rights because in objecting to the purchasers suit for performance it asserted the right of first refusal, also Property owner did not answer intervening complaint from first refuser, leading to a "default" of those issuesWiese filed an answer to Greenhall's amended complaint. In that answer, Wiese specifically and affirmatively alleged that Clatterbuck had exercised the right of first refusal. Wiese also submitted an affidavit in support of summary judgment against Greenhall in which Wiese affirmatively alleged that Clatterbuck had exercised the right of first refusal. The record does not contain any responsive pleading filed by Wiese in reply to Clatterbuck's complaint in intervention (which alleged proper exercise of the right of first refusal) or in response to Clatterbuck's motion for summary judgment against Wiese on the issue of specific performance. It is fundamental in Nebraska that allegations of a complaint not denied are admitted without any predicate ruling from the trial court. See Nolan v. Campbell, 13 Neb. App. 212, 690 N.W.2d 638 (2004). Further, an admission made in a pleading on which the trial is had is more than an ordinary admission; it is a judicial admission and constitutes a waiver of all controversy so far as the adverse party desires to take advantage of it, and therefore is a limitation of the issues. Saberzadeh v. Shaw, 266 Neb. 196, 663 N.W.2d 612 (2003). Judgment of the District Court ultimately in favor of first refuser is affirmed