Nebraska Supreme Court rules against sign company that challenged city ordinances that prohibited displaying company's signs once its leases terminated with land owners. Larmar Co. v. City of Fremont, S-08-590, 278 Neb. 485. But the sign company beat a claim for frivolous case penalties because its attorneys were well prepared. "The district court properly concluded that when Lamar’s leases were terminated by their terms, Lamar’s rights with respect to the nonconforming use of the signs were extinguished and remained with the current landowner. Furthermore, Lamar lacked standing to raise its "as applied" and facial challenges to ordinance No. 4032 and the district court was not in error in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on Lamar’s remaining claims. Further, the district court did not err in denying the cross-appellants’ request for attorney fees."

Extreme Makeover, Nebraska Supreme Court style: Nebraska Supreme Court hears duplex owners' appeal of Omaha Housing Authority's building code citations: the Metropolitan Utilities District has exclusive control over gas appliances; The city could not cite the owners for sloppy painting, tuck pointing and stucco repairs that were not themselves repairs the owners took to remedy code violations. McNally v. City of Omaha, S-05-1022 The City cited the owners for various code violations on a duplex they owned. Some of the citations were for painting over windows, failing to paint stucco exteriors and poor tuck pointing of masonry. Also the MUD had inspected a gas furnace but the City had not given its ok. Supreme Court holds that poor or sloppy repairs are not violations unless they are to repair cited problems. Also the MUD was the right agency to inspect specifically gas powered appliances. " 48-15 states: “repairs, maintenance work, alterations or installations which are caused directly or indirectly by the enforcement of this code shall be executed and installed in a workmanlike manner and installed in accordance with the manufacturer’s installation instructions.” Whether or not the unattractiveness of the repairs could fall under this definition of “workmanlike,” the Mcnallys argue that § 48-15 is inapplicable. the window trim painting, the stucco, and the tuck-pointing were repairs which the Mcnallys conducted on their own accord. We agree that § 48-15 is inapplicable in this case because the ordinance clearly limits the “workmanlike” mandate to situations where the work is conducted pursuant to enforcement of the Code."