Nebraska court of appeals dismisses partial appeal of partnership dispute between daughter-in-law and parents of her deceased husband because the Dundy County District Court failed to make specific findings that the the daughter-in-law's partial appeal should proceed under 25-1315 RRS Neb. Jones v. Jones, A-05-1076, 16 Neb. App. 452. Daughter-in-law acting as her deceased husband's personal representatives sue his parents for a partnership accounting along with other contractual and tort actions. The District Court granted the in-laws directed verdict on the plaintiff's accounting claim and on its own agreed to certify the directed verdict as "final" for appeal purposes under 25-1315 RRS Neb. Later the District Court granted the in-laws summary judgment on the remaining cases. The Court of Appeals had initially dismissed the appeal from the directed verdict, then recalled and consolidated it with the appeal of the remaining counts. Finally the Court of Appeals dismisses the first appeal. the trial court apparently attempted to certify as final the judgment for directed verdict out of which this appeal arises. The Nebraska Supreme Court disapproved routine 25-1315 certifications in Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007) when it held the trial court must make specific findings to justify the partial appeal to avoid "piecemeal...appeals..occasioning... the use of more judicial resources...than...required (for a single appeal)."

The Nebraska Legislature's version of the Revised Uniform Partnership agreement (RUPA) states its policy that partnership statutes should mostly serve as gap-filling provisions when the parties partnership agreement does not address an issue regarding the partnership. Moreover the State states with the RUPA that it prefers partnerships keep operating while dealing fairly with departing partners rather than having partner departures routinely cause partnership dissolution. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejects withdrawing partner's demand that the Lancaster County District Court should have ordered the parties partnership dissolved when the partner who chose to continue the business failed to timely buy-out the withdrawing partner according to their agreement. Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, S-06-319, 275 Neb. 112 "The UPA ’s default rules are gap-filling rules that control only when a question is not resolved by the parties’express provisions in an agreement. Section 67-404 carries out the legislative intent to make the partnership provisions the controlling rules and the 1998 UPA provisions the default rules. Section 67-431 provides that a partner’s voluntary withdrawal no longer results in mandatory dissolution; it results in a partner’s “dissociation.” S ection 67-433(1) manifests a legislative intent to create separate paths—dissolution and winding up or mandatory buyout—through which a dissociated partner can recover partnership interests: “If a partner’s dissociation results in a dissolution and winding up of the partnership business, sections 67-439 to 67-445 [dealing with dissolution and winding up] apply; otherwise, sections 67-434 to 67-438 [dealing with mandatory buyout] apply.”26 The comment to § 603 of RUPA , the section upon which § 67-433 is patterned, specifically provides that it operates as a “‘switching’” provision. "To maintain a sensible and consistent scheme and to give effect to every provision.28 When read together with § 67-404 (partnership agreement controls except for limited exceptions) and § 67-433 (providing separate paths of dissolution or mandatory buyout), we conclude dissolution for a partner’s voluntary withdrawal under § 67-439(1) is a default rule. Section 67-439(1) applies only when the partnership agreement does not provide for the partnership business to continue. Moreover, the 1998 UPA specifically requires that we apply and construe the act “to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of the act among states enacting it. " "UPA ’s rule of mandatory dissolution upon a partner’s withdrawal is a default rule. It “applies only [absent] an agreement affording the other partners a right to continue the business.”Under the partnership agreement, Harley did not have the right to force the partnership’s dissolution when Don elected to continue the business. the partnership agreement to mandate a buyout of a withdrawing partner’s interest, but it failed to specify a remedy for the partnership’s failure to pay, or to timely pay, the buyout price. Therefore, because the agreement is silent on this point, the default rules of the 1998 UPA apply.Although Don failed to timely pay the buyout price, absent a remedy provision in the agreement, Harley’s remedy was statutory. H is statutory remedy against the partnership did not include dissolution, and he waived the remedy of judicial valuation. Therefore, section 12 of the agreement provided the method for determining his interest’s value."

Nebraska Supreme Court announces simplified test to determine whether courts should consider parties business associations to be partnerships and holds that the standard would be a preponderance of the evidence whether in a dispute between business associates or between buseinss associates and outside parties. In re Dissolution & Winding Up of KeyTronics, S-06-690, 274 Neb. 936. The parties to the dispute worked together to market and operate automatic payment systems for automatic carwash stations. After the business failed one of the business associates sought an accounting and winding up of the operation claiming they had a partnership under Uniform P artnership A ct. S ection 67-410(1) RRS Neb. The district court denied the putative partners accounting complaint. Nebraska Supreme Court on denovo review of this equity action reverses, finding that the Plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a partnership existed. Willson admits he is not pursuing an action for an accounting of a partnership that would be limited to the development of a key dispenser-revalue station. T hat product was never produced and did not independently garner any profits to account for. We are instead asked to determine whether K ing and Willson were partners in an enterprise that involved both the development of the key dispenser-revalue station and the sales and maintenance of the regular QuikPay line. If so, Wilson claims that K ing must account to Willson for any profits relating to all QuikPay business. The elements disputed by the parties are whether there was an “association” formed for QuikPay business, and whether such association, if created, was as “co-owners.” We have never explained, nor is there any reasoning to support, the confusing myriad of standards we have applied to what is, effectively, the same legal issue. T hus, we believe that the tenuous distinction between actions by alleged partners inter sese and actions by a third party against the alleged partnership should be abolished. By eliminating any common-law distinctions as to the burden of proof between actions alleging a partnership inter sese and actions by third parties, we bring greater predictability and consistency to partnership determinations. In our de novo review, we thus determine whether Willson established by a preponderance of the evidence that he and King were partners in a business that entailed both the development of the key dispenser-revalue station and regular QuikPay sales and maintenance We conclude that the objective, as well as subjective, indicia are sufficient to prove co-ownership of the business of selling,maintaining, and developing QuikPay. H aving already concluded that there was an association for the same, we conclude that Willson proved that he and K ing had formed a partnership for the business of selling, maintaining, and developing QuikPay.Because Willson has proved a partnership relationship with King, he is entitled to a winding up and an accounting in accordance with the A ct. T he district court erred in concluding otherwise. A ccordingly, we reverse the decision and remand the cause for further proceedings.

Partners' stated in their agreement that once a partner sought to exit the partnership, another partner could within 90 days buy out the exiting partner. Nebraska Supreme Court rules that the 90 day time period started when the exiting partner served his complaint from an earlier case he brought to dissolve the partnership. Mogensen v. Mogensen, S-05-879, 273 Neb. 208 Partners had also acquired property and titled it in the mothers name. The partners provided the downpayment and the mother financed it. The partners did not pay rent to their mother for eight years but made improvements on the property. Supreme court agrees that the property although in the mothers name is presumed partnership land, and the mother did not overcome this presumption. "service of the complaint on keith, rather than either the summary judgment order or the filing of the lawsuit, provided notice of steven’s intent to withdraw and dispose of his interest The mother's property is partnership property because although some evidence does indicate an ownership interest in opal, it is not enough to overcome the presumption in § 67-412(3). We conclude that the brothers purchased the property for the partnership. the most convincing proof of their intent is that brian, keith, and steven decided they wanted the property and then decided to put it in opal’s name to take advantage of a government program. the brothers essentially controlled the transaction in obtaining the land, including using partnership funds to pay for the property. the facts that the partnership developed the land, paid the real estate taxes, and improved the farm for the first 8 years without paying rent further bolster our conclusion