Nebraska Supreme Court allows award for loss of earning power to injured truck driver who had previously received Social Security Disability Income benefits but returned to work under the Social Security Administration "Ticket to Work" program. Manchester v. Drivers Mgmt., S-09-062, 278 Neb. 776 Because Plaintiff had an earning power to lose, her receipt of Social Security benefits based on an earlier determination of total disability did not prevent her from recovering workers’ compensation benefits. ..the existence of the Social Security rehabilitative programs indicates that an individual once assessed by the Social Security Administration to be totally disabled is not expected to be forever unable to work. See 42 U.S.C. § 422 (2006).. Plaintiff participated in the "Ticket to Work" program and was working her way off Social Security disability. Because Plaintiff was able to resume gainful employment and had worked for Drivers Management for 13 months before the accident, the Social Security Administration’s determination that at one point in time she was totally disabled does not logically prevent her from later recovering workers’ compensation benefits for her loss of earning capacity due to a disability incurred in the course of her employment

Nebraska Court of Appeals excludes a divorcing spouse's lump sum social security disability award from the couple's marital assets, but the divorce court judge should consider the social security payment when dividing the remaining assets that are marital. Dinges v. Dinges, A-06-239, 16 Neb. App. 275. Divorcing wife received a lump sum social security disability (SSDI) award of $27000 and the couple used the funds to purchase a modular home. The trial judge included the SSDI award in the couple's marital assets. The wife represented herself and also objected to the court's refusal to hold a pre-trial conference. Nebraska Court of Appeals overrules the wife's objections to the conduct of the trial judge but modifies the division of assets to exclude the social security award while still considering the award when dividing the remainder of the marital assets. "the trial court erred in stating that it “should consider the lump sum award received by wife as a marital asset subject to division in this dissolution proceeding” and then including the modular home, purchased post separation with the Social Security funds, in the marital estate. The Nebraska Supreme Court’s holding in Webster v. Webster, 271 Neb. 788, 716 N.W.2d 47 (2006), precludes such treatment. However, we must also decide the issue discussed but not reached by the Webster court. We hold that while an offset of a Social Security award is prohibited by the anti-assignment clause of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000) and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a court may properly consider a spouse’s Social Security award in equitably dividing the marital property. We rely upon the “weight of authority” noted by the Webster court. See id. at 798, 716 N.W.2d at 55. Of course, such award is only one of many factors which we consider in our de novo review of the division of marital property."

Nebraska Supreme Court declines to reduce father's child support obligation for social security benefits one of his disabled children receives. Gress v. Gress, S-06-607, 274 Neb. 686. One of the father's children had downs syndrome and received $564 per month social security benefits. the decision does not specify whether the social security took the form of SSI or SSDI. The father argued that in accordance with Ward v. Ward, 7 N eb. A pp. 821, 585 N .W.2d 551 (1998) he should receive a credit for some of the social security support. The Nebraska Supreme Court declines to overrule Ward, distinguishing the situation where a disabled child has additional needs that government benefits support from one where the child is otherwise normal but receives the benefits because of the death of the parent. "it not appropriate to offset child support costs where, as here, the Social Security benefits are intended to mitigate the additional costs that accompany disabilities." The Supreme Court might have discussed whether it would distinguish between Title II disability benefits, for example benefits to children of deceased or disabled workers and Title XVI benefits which are benefits to disabled children that parents' payroll contributions do not fund.