Employment dispute shows it takes getting used to notice pleading

Blinn v. Beatrice Community Hosp. & Health Ctr., 13 Neb. App. 459 Filed April 19, 2005. No. A-04-079 shows it takes getting used to Nebraskas still new federal style "notice pleading" rules. District Court dismissed an employment contract dispute between a hospital and its fired employee on summary judgment, as employment is at will and a subsequent promise to offer work for 5 years or until retirement appeared to make the relationship a contract requiring a writing under the "statute of frauds." . Although the plaintiff's pleading alleges a five year oral contract, the affidavits and depositions both parties used on the summaryjudgment motion hint an alternative contract period for employment as fiveyears or until retirement. The Appeals Court therefore considered (plaintiff’s) pleading amended by implied consent to properly raise the allegation that Beatrice offered him employment until such time as he chose to retire because evidence on the issue not pled is offered and received by the court without objection, the issue is properly considered and the parties are considered to have impliedly consented to having the issue tried. So Federal Pleading rules that easily forgive inartful pleading and inattentive lawyers still satisfy the parties to a lawsuit's due process right to have their pleadings determine the issues for the court's resolution. Spanish Oaks v. Hy-Vee, 265 Neb. 133, 655 N.W.2d 390 (2003)

No statute of frauds problem either because retirement could take a little or a long time, because in theory, Blinn could choose to retire within 1 year, making the agreement capable of being performed within 1 year. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36-202

Throw in a little promissory estoppel for good measure to justify throwing out yet another summary judgment motion: a binding promise is reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance on the other's or a third person's part and which does induce such action or forbearance if enforcement of promise is only way to avoid an injustice. Folgers Architects v. Kerns, 9 Neb. App. 406, 612 N.W.2d 539 (2000), reversed in part on other grounds 262 Neb. 530, 633 N.W.2d 114 (2001). See, also, Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999). Promissory estoppel requires reasonable and foreseeable reliance. Folgers Architects v. Kerns, supra.