Lincoln cardiologist's ex wife loses appeal of defense verdict that was in favor of her former divorce attorney; Nebraska Court of Appeals (unpublished opinion) agrees that Lancaster County District Court properly overruled her (Plaintiff's) motion for a directed verdictCaudill v. Roberts, A-04-1314; Ex wife of prominent Lincoln cardiologist Christopher Caudill sued her divorce counsel for negligently allowing her physician husband to keep several limited partnerships while agreeing that their value would be a negative $400K. After the negative partnership value, the parties split a $10 million marital estate roughly in half. After the divorce doctor's exwife contended the attorney negligently investigated the value of the property and the tax consequences. The district court did rule on partial summary judgment that in the divorce the parties should have considered the tax consequences of splitting the partnerships only if the divorce would have forced their sale, citing Schuman v. Schuman, 265 Neb. 459, 658 N.W.2d 30 (2003), but did not rule on the defendant's liability. The court overruled the plaintiff's motion for directed verdict and the jury found for the defendant attorneys. Court of appeals affirms Various witnesses gave conflicting opinions as to the potential value or negative value of the partnerships, and what actions the wife as succeeding owner would have to take to preserve them. "Roberts testified that he has had previous cases dealing with limited partnerships and that they have too many downside risks to take them in a divorce. Roberts testified that he knew the limited partnerships were involved in real estate and that he discussed with Nancy doing an appraisal but that it would be expensive and that nothing may come out of it. He suggested to Nancy that she and Christopher should split the limited partnerships "50/50." He testified that he told her they were risky and that there could come a time when she may have to put money into them. (We digress to recall that at oral argument, Nancy's counsel argued that a limited partner never is obligated for further capital contributions--but there was no evidence at trial to support such claim, nor was there any evidence to dispute Roberts' testimony as to the risk of further contributions to these particular limited partnerships.) Roberts testified that Nancy told him that she did not want any risk. He testified that if they had gone to trial over the issue, she would not be happy if she got the limited partnerships; thus, he told her that settlement was the best option. Roberts testified that in attempting to agree to a property settlement, the parties had to do some "give and take." It is noteworthy that Christopher's counsel testified that if the negative tax consequences of the partnerships were not included in the property division, he would have advised his client to try this issue; and we note that although there was a settlement, a number of unsettled issues were tried. Our brief recounting of the foregoing key testimony clearly reveals evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that Roberts did not violate the standard of care--remembering that on a motion for a directed verdict every controverted fact must be resolved in favor of Roberts. Galter's testimony was that Roberts met the standard of care, and by itself, it would prevent the trial court's entering a direction that Roberts had breached the standard of care with respect to his handling of the limited partnerships and advice to his client. Consequently, the district court did not commit error in denying the motion for a directed verdict. AFFIRMED