Nebraska Supreme Court reverses the Platte County District Court and allows the Department of Motor Vehicles to seek to enhance a driver's license suspension if the driver had a prior alcohol-related license suspension. Stenger v. Department of Motor Vehicles, S-06-1176, 274 Neb. 819 § 60-498.01 permits the hearing officer at the Administrative License Revocation hearing (ALR) the receive evidence for enhancement at a revocation hearing. A lthough 60-498.01 limits the issues under dispute, it does not prohibit evidence pertinent to the ultimate disposition of a case after those issues have been resolved. Whether a person’s driver’s license has previously been revoked is relevant evidence in determining the length of the revocation under § 60-498.02(1)(b). Therefore, § 60-498.01 allows receiving the driving abstract to enhance a revocation, and we hold that a driving abstract may be admitted in an A LR proceeding for that purpose. A party still may contest the accuracy of the abstract as to whether the party did in fact have a prior revocation. S ection 60-498.02(1)(b) explicitly provides that if a driving abstract shows that the driver had a revocation in the prior 12 years, the revocation can be enhanced to 1 year. T herefore, the Legislature clearly intended for the Department to consider such matter in the ALR proceedings

Nebraska Supreme Court allows Otoe County to require mutual impact easements when real estate developers seek permits to build houses close to existing hog confinement facilities. Coffey v. County of Otoe, S-06-921, 274 Neb. 796A property developer and a purchaser of one of his lots sought to build a house that was close to an existing hog confinement facility. Otoe County required in its zoning regulations that homeowners and livestock producers file mutual impact easements before it would allow the building to continue. When the livestock producer refused to grant the easement and Otoe County refused to allow a variance, the developer and his customer sued. The Otoe County District Court reversed finding the mutual impact easement requirement was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Nebraska Supreme Court reverses, the zoning regulations were proper exercises of zoning power. "If the consent is used for no other purpose than to waive or modify a restriction which the governing body has lawfully created and has provided for such a waiver or modification by those most affected, then the consent is regarded as being within constitutional limitations," Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 37 S . Ct. 190, 61 L. E d. 472 (1917).we conclude that the mutual impact easement language in Otoe County’s zoning regulations is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise

Juvenile courts may not consider the willingness of prospective parents to adopt the children of parents against whom the State seeks to terminate parental rights (Section 43-292.02). However the court's considering the adoptive parents' willingness to adopt and other testimony was harmless error and did not impair the terminated parent's due process. In re Interest of Destiny A. et al., S-06-1380, 274 Neb. 713

Nebraska Supreme Court affirms dismissal of Douglas County security employee who while on sick leave worked a second job, even though the disciplinary citation and a supervisor referenced a mistaken allegation that his off-duty injury that lead to the employee's taking sick leave was during outside employment. Hickey v. Civil Serv. Comm. of Douglas Cty., S-06-802, 274 Neb. 554. Plaintiff injured his had during off-duty time and he received sick leave from his employer Douglas county Nebraska. Later the county discovered he was working at a second job while drawing sick leave pay. The county moved to dismiss plaintiff and plaintiff appealed. One of the plaintiff's supervisors testified mistakenly that the county dismissed plaintiff because he was injured while working a second job and sought sick leave pay for the injury. But the disciplinary notice and other employees testified that the county dismissed plaintiff for working at outside employment while drawing sick leave. Supreme Court affirms. "the record clearly establishes, despite supervisor’s confusion, that Hickey’s employment was terminated for violating section 2(a) (against outside employment on sick leave) and that he had notice of and the opportunity to defend himself against that charge. We find no due process violation."