Follow up: NCA upholds dismissing action against already deceased Lutheran High School Teacher in Seward for sexual abuse plaintiff alleged occurred in the early 70's. NCA finds the "continuing tort" tolling doctrine applicable to professional negligence cases did not apply where the defendant intermittently wrote letters to the Plaintiff over the years. Finally even if the Plaintiff suffered from a mental disorder the court requires proof of Plaintiff's mental incapacity to protect her legal rights before allowing her cause of action to toll. Anonymous v. St. John Lutheran Church, 14. Neb. App. 42 September 27, 2005. No. A-04-275.Anonymous filed suit against St. John Lutheran Church of Seward, Nebraska, a Nebraska corporation, and Gary Lewien and John Doe 1 through 2,300 (real names unknown), doing business as St. John Lutheran Congregation, an unincorporated religious association (collectively St. John); the Nebraska District of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, a Nebraska corporation, and the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, a Missouri corporation (subsequently dismissed as parties); and the estate of David Mannigel, deceased (Estate of Mannigel), based upon allegations of sexual abuse perpetrated by Mannigel in the early 1970's when Anonymous was between the ages of 10 and 12. Finding that Anonymous' claims were barred by the statute of limitations, the district court granted summary judgment and dismissed the petition. We affirm.Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207(3) (Reissue 1995) sets forth a 4-year statute of limitations for "an action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-213 (Reissue 1995) provides that if a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this chapter . . . is, at the time the cause of action accrued, within the age of twenty years, a person with a mental disorder, or imprisoned, every such person shall be entitled to bring such action within the respective times limited by this chapter after such disability is removed. [3-5] The alleged abuse occurred in 1971 and 1972, when Anonymous was between the ages of 10 and 12. Because the alleged abuse occurred when Anonymous was "within the age of 20 years," see § 25-213, Anonymous had 4 years from the time she became 21 years of age to file suit. See Brown v. Kindred, 259 Neb. 95, 100, 608 N.W.2d 577, 580 (2000) ("'within the age of 20 years'" means until one becomes 21 years old). Contrary to the district court's finding that Anonymous attained the age of majority in 1981, we observe that Anonymous turned 21 in 1982Anonymous did not file the petition until after the death of Mannigel.Although Anonymous argues that she suffered from a mental disorder that prevented her from instituting legal action, such assertion is unsupported by the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Anonymous. Continuing Tort doctrine in applicableNebraska law does recognize that a continuous relationship may toll the statute of limitations but requires that there be a continuity of the relationship and services for the same or a related subject matter after the alleged professional negligence. See Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 256 Neb. 442, 590 N.W.2d 380 (1999). A "continuing tort doctrine" is inapplicable in the case before us. The alleged sexual abuse ceased in 1972. Although a counselor explained that each time Mannigel corresponded with Anonymous it was like "tearing the scab off of a wound," Mannigel's contact with Anonymous after that point--such as sending Anonymous cards and money and seeing her at her parent's house--was not wrongful conduct in the legal sense and does not rise to the level needed to be actionable as an intentional infliction of emotional distress.Anonymous attempts to define the continual ill effects of the original violations as continuing unlawful acts. Construing Mannigel's subsequent contacts as unlawful--and thus equating them with the earlier acts of sexual abuse--would throw open the doors to permit filing of such actions at any time. A chance encounter on a city street would be given the same legal effect as the despicable acts of sexual abuse which were alleged to have occurred during the 1970's. We decline to apply the continuing tort doctrine in such fashion.Mental Disorder. Anonymous also argues that § 25-213--which tolls the time for bringing an action if the claimant "is, at the time the cause of action accrued . . . a person with a mental disorder"--applies in the case before us. In Vergara v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 Neb. App. 1141, 510 N.W.2d 550 (1993), this court determined that the substitution of the phrase "a person with a mental disorder" for the word "insane" in § 25-213 did not change the legal standard involved. We found that a person with a mental disorder is one who suffers from a condition of mental derangement which actually prevents the sufferer from understanding his or her legal rights or from instituting legal action. Vergara, supra. A mental disorder within the meaning of § 25-213 is an incapacity which disqualifies one from acting for the protection of one's rights. Vergara, supra.(Plaintiff's experts witnesses affidavits fail to state an admissible opinion that her mental disorders were of this severity to allow tolling the statute of limitations.)Viewed in the light most favorable to Anonymous, this evidence does not establish an issue of fact concerning the existence of a mental disorder within the meaning of § 25-213.