Supremes uphold quo warranto removal of county board member who submitted resignation letter then retracted it. When disgruntled Boone County commissioner Randolph Little signed a resignation letter, he told the Commissioner Chairman Henry Thieman to do what was necessary to effect his resignation. When Little changed his mind he tried to stay in office. Supremes uphold Boone County attorney's quo warranto action to remove Little from office, finding that Commissioner Little's handing the resignation letter to the chairman amounted to giving the chairman apparent authority to carry out the steps to have Little resign from the Boone County Board. Little also alleged mutual mistake because neither he nor Thiemann board chairman followed proper procedures. Supremes hold this error waived. State ex rel. Medlin v. Little, 270 Neb. 414 September 23, 2005. No. S-04-830. Connolly, Justice: § 32-562(5) RRS Neb(Reissue 2004) provides the procedure to follow when a county commissioner resigns from office. It states that a resignation becomes effective when accepted by the county clerk. The appellant, Randolph C. Little, drafted and signed a letter of resignation and delivered it to Henry R. Thieman, the chairman of the Boone County Board of Commissioners. Thieman delivered the resignation to the Boone County clerk. Little claims that Thieman lacked authority to deliver the resignation letter. After the county attorney filed a quo warranto action, the district court found that Little had resigned and ousted him from office. Little appeals. We affirm because, in our de novo review, we find that Thieman had apparent authority to deliver the resignation to the county clerk. "Although an agency relationship existed between Little and Thieman, we look to whether Thieman acted within the scope of the agency. The scope of an agent’s authority is a question of fact. Oddo v. Speedway Scaffold Co., 233 Neb. 1, 443 N.W.2d 596 (1989). When establishing agency, a fact finder must consider the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties’ relationship, their usual course of dealing, any instructions given, the parties’ conduct, and the nature of the transaction. See Goldfein v. Continental Ins. Co., 125 Neb. 112, 249 N.W. 78 (1933)." Apparent or ostensible authority gives a professed agent the power to affect the principal’s legal relationships with third parties. The power arises from, and is limited to, the principal’s manifestations to those third parties about the relationships. See Franksen v. Crossroads Joint Venture, 245 Neb. 863, 515 N.W.2d 794 (1994). Said another way, apparent authority is such authority as the agent seems to have by reason of the authority she or he actually has. Double K, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 245 Neb. 712, 515 N.W.2d 416 (1994). in order for the principal to incur responsibility for the acts of an agent with apparent authority, the authority must be traceable to the principal’s own conduct; it cannot be established only by the agent’s acts, declaration, or conduct. Double K, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 245 Neb. 712, 515 N.W.2d 416 (1994). Apparent authority to perform an act exists when a principal’s conduct causes a third person to reasonably believe that the principal agreed that the person purporting to act for him or her could do so. See First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Acceptance Ins. Cos., 12 Neb. App. 353, 675 N.W.2d 689 (2004) By drafting the letter, signing it, delivering it to Thieman, and then instructing him to “do what you have to do,” Little clothed Thieman with apparent authority. Aware of these facts, the county clerk could reasonably believe that Thieman had the authority to tender Little’s resignation. Moreover, Little’s nonchalant instruction carelessly set off the chain of events leading to the county clerk’s acceptance of the letter.