NCA reverses child support modification, trial court had disregarded previous appeal mandate

Case where parents barely break $50k annual salary goes up a 4th time to the appeals court; Although last time the district court tried the case, it applied 2002 revisions to child support guidelines, the Appeals court found this violated the court's mandate to apply Prochasksa "interdependent" calculation method. Further the companion appealed case the court deprived the father of the defense of having subsequent children to a mother's motion to increase child support. Mace v. Mace, 13 Neb. App. 896 September 13, 2005. Nos. A-03-375, A-03-376. Paragraph T was added to the guidelines and became effective on September 1, 2002, and it states: An obligor shall not be allowed a reduction in an existing support order solely because of the birth, adoption, or acknowledgment of subsequent children of the obligor; however, a duty to provide regular support for subsequent children may be raised as a defense to an action for an upward modification of such existing support order. There are two problems with the district court’s application of paragraph T. First, in the instant case, the amount of the “existing support order” would be the amount that we have mandated above in regard to case No. A-03-375. In the proceedings in case No. A-03-376, Jerry was not seeking a reduction in support; Wanda was seeking an increase. By utilizing a calculation that considered only the initial support obligation for the three subject children as of the date of the initial decree, the district court deprived Jerry of the defense of paragraph T concerning Jerry’s obligation to support Kirsty. [12] Secondly, and more importantly, the district court failed to justify its methodology by showing that it had “‘“done the math.”’” See Gallner v. Hoffman, 264 Neb. 995, 1002, 653 N.W.2d 838, 844 (2002) (quoting Stewart v. Stewart, 9 Neb. App. 431, 613 N.W.2d 486 (2000)). In case No. A-03-376, unlike in case No. A-03-375, there has been no previous appeal and there is no earlier mandate binding the trial court’s determination of what methodology to use in recognizing Jerry’s obligation to Kirsty. In Emery v. Moffett, 269 Neb. 867, 697 N.W.2d 249 (2005), the Nebraska Supreme Court reiterated its earlier holding in Brooks v. Brooks, 261 Neb. 289, 622 N.W.2d 670 (2001), that a trial court has discretion to choose whether and how to calculate a deduction for subsequent children, but that it must do so in a manner that does not benefit one family at the expense of the other. In the instant case, the “method” selected by the district court clearly benefits the three children of Jerry and Wanda at the expense of Kirsty. While the district court was not, in case No. A-03-376, restricted to the methodology of Prochaska v. Prochaska, 6 Neb. App. 302, 573 N.W.2d 777 (1998), it was required to use some principled basis that did not benefit one family at the expense of the other. In failing to do so, the district court abused its discretion.